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Abstract  
 
The extant literatures often focus on the efficiency of standard committees to 
coordinate conflicts between members and how regulatory capture occurs, 
thus neglecting the impact of cooperation behaviour on the technology 
standard setting process. This paper aims to explore how structural 
embeddedness affects firms’ impact on the technology standard setting 
process. We construct a network with the national standard data in China's 
communications industry in 2000-2017. With 326 firms participating in 
the standard formulation as the research sample, we use the negative 
binomial regression method to explore the relationship between structural 
embeddedness of technology sponsors and the impacts on the technology 
standard setting process. We find that while there is an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between the number of direct collaborators and firms’ impacts 
on the technology standard setting process, the structural holes positively 
affect firms’ impacts on the technology standard setting process. The 
conclusions obtained from this paper have important managerial 
implications for firms participating the technology standard setting 
processes. 
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1. Introduction 
Standardization can be critical in determining a technology‟s success and often plays a vital role in 
supporting major technological and societal trends. Many important ongoing developments, such as the 
transformation towards a platform economy, making things „smart‟ and innovating large, complex systems 
rely on standardization. Technology standard emerges primarily through two mechanisms: market-based 
mechanism and committee-based mechanism (Farrell & Saloner, 1988; Funk & Methe, 2011). Although most 
literature has focused on the technology standard derived through market competition (Sheremata, 2004) 
more and more standards are created by standards development organizations (SDO), such as IEEE, ISO and 
ITU. For example, in the field of information technology, there are more than 550 organizations committed to 
the development of information technology standards. 
In extant literature, some scholars have focused on the relationship between inter-firm cooperation and 
standard development ability. For example, Leiponen (2008) examined the relationship between informal 
alliances, the tie strength of between members of the standards development organizations (SDO) and their 
standardization capabilities based on the 3GPP standard. They found that the more the number of partners, 
and the closer the relationship with SDO members, the greater their influence on formal standard setting 
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process. Other scholars have investigated the impact of the network location on firms‟ standard development 
ability.  
Since the “unanimous consent” or “absolute majority” rules are usually adopted by the standard 
committees during the technology standard setting process, the extant literatures often focus on the efficiency 
of standard committees to coordinate conflicts between members (Blind, 2011) and how regulatory capture 
occurs (Blind, Petersen, & Riillo, 2017) thus neglecting the impact of cooperation behaviour on the technology 
standard setting process. Further, since firms are not atomic actors, but are embedded in networks composed 
of diverse relationships, previous literature have examined how network location affects the behaviour and 
performance of individuals (individuals, teams, firms, etc.)(Geerten, 2017) the network structure and network 
relationships may be leveraged by technology sponsors to influence the decisions of potential technology 
supporters and to acquire the technical and marketing resources which are needed to diffuse the technology 
standard. Along this line of thought, this paper uses the social network theory to the context of committee-
based standard setting process, then examines the relationship between the structural embeddedness and their 
influence on technology standard setting process. 
 
2. Theory and Hypotheses 
Social network theory shows that the positions of actors in the network not only affect the frequency of 
contact and interaction with other members, but also affect the attractiveness of actors to other network 
members. Actors in the core position of the network can take advantage of the network location to gain better 
information and resources and thereby influence other actors. In addition, actors at the core position of the 
network have a larger “intelligence network” compared to actors at the periphery of the network, thereby 
gaining more information about potential partners and opportunities for collaboration. Such actor may not 
only access other members with the shortest possible paths, but also have more opportunities to connect with 
actors who are also at the core of the network. Network centrality may be used measure the extent to which 
actors act as network “hubs” and the extent to which resources are acquired and controlled. It can also be used 
to measure the extent of actors‟ popularity and attractiveness in the network.  
In this article, structural embeddedness describes the overall relationships between actors, providing 
information on the interrelated actors‟ location in the network and how these actors get connected. This paper 
focuses on two characteristics of structural embeddedness: degree centrality and structural holes. 
In social networks, degree centrality is a widely used measurement on structural embeddedness, which 
describes the power and superiority of actors. Similarly, in a standards network, firms in the core position will 
have direct ties with most other firms in the network, and thus have a strategic importance in the network. 
The existence of these ties may promote the sharing and combination of knowledge or resources between 
firms, thus providing firms with new knowledge and increasing their resource endowments. Lee and Song 
(2017) have found that technology sponsors with higher network centrality can attract more potential 
supporters, thus helping them to expand the scale and diversity of standard alliances. Thus, we can assume 
that the more centrally located in a standards network, the greater the number of direct ties, and the more 
easily to access to new knowledge, ideas and resources, thereby increasing firms‟ impacts on the technology 
standard setting process. 
However, Uzzi (1997) mentioned that excessively embedded network relationships may cause instability, 
thus reducing the flow of new information in the network. Furthermore, excessively embedded relationships in 
the network could produce negative emotions among the firms, thus negatively affect the collaborative 
relationships in the network. Christensen (1992) also argued that excessively embedded network relationships 
may create inertia, making their behaviour less proactive. Additional, densely network relationships may 
result in higher opportunity costs, organizations may have to maintain strong connections by invest 
significant resources or time, rather than linking them to non-redundant participants (Molina & Martínez, 
2009). Based on the above, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1: In the standards network, there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between degree 
centrality and the impacts on the technology standard setting process. 
In addition to being the core of the network, being the resource intermediary is also conducive to 
expanding the resource endowment of the actor. Burt (1992) argued that in the social network, ties between 
nodes can provide a certain amount of information, but if diverse ties in the network provide the same 
information, there will be information redundancy. Therefore, non-redundant ties should be promoted in the 
network because they can provide heterogeneous information (Burt, 1992; Ronald, 2004). A structural hole is 
understood as a gap between two individuals who have complementary sources to information. In an open 
network with many structural holes, actors who connect between organizations can leverage their “bridge” 
role to connect with new members in other groups to control heterogeneous information and resources more 
quickly. Zeng, Zou, and Zhang (2015) found that firms with rich structure holes may access more information 
in different fields, so as to have a better understanding about the knowledge or complementary technologies 
needed for diversifying activities that are different from the routine businesses. Therefore, we can assume that 
in the standards network, firms in the structural hole position will grasp more heterogeneous information and 
resources because of their "bridge" role, which will increase the opportunities for firms to participate in the 
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formulation of standards, and thus increasing firms‟ impacts on the technology standard setting process. 
Therefore, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2: In the standards, the structural hole location is positively related with firms‟ impacts on 
the technology standard setting process. 
 
3. Research Methodology 
3.1. Sample and Data Collection 
Communication technology is a cumulative evolution technology. The development of new technologies is 
supplemented and improved based on the original technology or combined with other existing technologies, 
so as to obtain better functions or better performances. Therefore, in the field of communication technology, 
there are many innovations that can be generated, patents‟ number is huge and the growth rate is significant. 
As the products and technologies update quickly, collaborations within the industry are frequent and network 
effects are obvious, thus the communication industry is suitable as the research context. 
The data is obtained from CNKI's Standard Data Pool. It is the largest and most complete standard 
databases in China. It contains all Chinese national standards (GB), national construction standards (GBJ) and 
Chinese industry standards. We retrieve the technology standard for communication industry of China from 
2000 to 2017 to construct a standards network. 
The specific search tactics are as follows: we first select "communication, broadcasting class" under 
Chinese standard document classification directory, then select communication, broadcast general, 
communication network and communication equipment under sub-directories. Because the technology 
standard related to communication are mainly in the above three areas, the remaining sub-directories such as 
radar, navigation, remote control, telemetry, antennas, radio and television networks, radio and television 
equipment, postal and other communication technologies are omitted. We use the above search results of the 
three areas as the communication industry standard samples. There are 3,534 standards and all involved 
standards are divided into national standards and industry standards (mainly postal and telecommunications 
industry standards). 
After searching the relevant standards documents, the documents titles are exported from CNKI and 
saved as Endnote format. With SATI, the sponsors are extracted by frequency statistics. Among them 57 
standard literatures whose sponsors are personal are excluded, and keep the 3,477 standards only whose 
sponsors are firms, universities or scientific research institutions. With SATI, it is found that in the period of 
2000-2017, there are 351 firms involved in technology standard setting in China's communication industry. 
Due to the large time span, some organizations have changing their names. By manually searching and 
verifying, organizations with changed name are classified as one name. For example, China Unicom Group 
Corporation is previously named as China United Communications Co., Ltd., China United Network 
Communications Co., Ltd., and the final name was China United Network Communications Group Co., Ltd. 
As another example, Shanghai Bell Alcatel Co., Ltd. was referred to as Shanghai Bell Co., Ltd. Name, so it was 
classified as Shanghai Bell Co., Ltd. After repeated verification, 327 firms are confirmed as our final sample. In 
order to examining the cooperative relationship between these firms, we generate an adjacency matrix by 
SATI, and then import it into UCINET 6.0 software, a network analysis tool, to obtain some network 
structure measurements. 
 
3.2. Measures 
3.2.1. Dependent Variables 
Firms’ impacts on the technology standard setting process. consistently with extant literature, this article takes 
the number of standards drafted by firms as the measurement of firms‟ impacts on the technology standard 
setting process. 
 
3.2.2. Independent Variables 
Degree centrality. Historically first and conceptually simplest is degree centrality, which is defined as the 
number of links incident upon a node (i.e., the number of ties that a node has). The degree can be interpreted in 
terms of the immediate risk of a node for catching whatever is flowing through the network (such as a virus, or 
some information). The degree centrality id  of the node i  is defined as follows: 
 
 
 
where mij refers to links between i  and the other nodes j  that other than i  in the network. Generally 
speaking, the greater the value of degree centrality, the more the actor is at the core of the network, and the 
more power it possesses. Therefore, the greater the degree centrality or the more the number of connected 
nodes, the greater the ability of an actor to influence others in the network. 
Structural holes. Most social structures tend to be characterized by dense clusters of strong connections, 
also known as network closure. The theory relies on a fundamental idea that the homogeneity of information, 

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new ideas, and behaviour is generally higher within any group of people as compared to that in between two 
groups of people. Four aspects are considered in Burt's structural hole index: effective size, efficiency, 
constraint, hierarchy (Burt, 1992). Among them, "constraint" refers to the ability of an actor to use structural 
holes in the network. Burt's formula for constraint is: 
 
 
 where iqp is the proportion of actor i‟s energy invested in relationship with q, and mqj is calculated as q‟s 
interaction with j divided by q‟s strongest relationship with anyone. In essence, the degree of restriction is the 
degree to which an actor is associated with other actors in the network, which may create a large amount of 
redundancy in the ego-network. Using the description of the structural hole index by Gonzalez, Veloso, and 
Krackhardt (2013) the structural hole is measured by "1-constraint". 
 
3.2.3. Control Variables 
The number of patents. Patents are the basis of technology standards, and patents filed and patents granted 
are factors that affecting the firms‟ impacts on the technology standard setting process. Therefore, the number 
of patent applications of firms during the participation in standards network is taken as a control variable. 
The number of times that firms participate in standards draft. The number of times that firms participate in 
standards draft is used as a control variable. The larger number of times that firms participate in the standard 
setting process means that firms may play a greater role in the standards network. 
 
4. Empirical Analyses 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
The data is processed and analyzed using Stata12.0 software. The descriptive statistics and correlation 
matrix are presented in Table 1. The dependent variable "firms‟ impacts on the technology standard setting 
process (StandImpac)" in this paper is a discrete non-negative integer, thus the Poisson regression model or 
negative binomial regression model should be used. Since the Poisson regression model requires the condition 
that the mean and variance of the dependent variable are equal, and the dependent variable is excessively 
dispersed (Expected value is 14.4, Variance is 62.3), the negative binomial regression model is more suitable. It 
can be seen from Table 1 that the correlation coefficients of all independent variables are less than 0.76, and 
multicollinearity is not a problem. 
 
Table-1. Descriptive Statistic and Correlations. 
Variable Means SD. Min. Max. 1 2 3 4 
1. StandImpac 14.3620 62.3277 1 655 1.000    
2. DegreCentr  2.9158 4.1329 0 34.945 0.8467 1.000   
3.Structure holes 0.6987 0.2528 -0.125 1 0.1990 0.4334 1.000  
4.Patents 373.3374 3177.316 0 42936 0.8179 0.6063 0.0897 1.000 
5. NumbeStan 1.2607 5.9502 0 58 0.8659 0.7586 0.1598 0.6248 
    Source: Output by Stata112.0. 
 
4.2. Empirical Results and Discussions 
Table 2 shows the results of negative binomial regression. Model 1 and Model 2 respectively examine the 
relationship between degree centrality, the structural hole and firms‟ impacts on the technology standard 
setting process.  
The firms‟ degree centrality has a significantly positive influence on their impacts on the technology 
standard setting process (β=0.5189, P<0.01), indicating that as the number of directly connected ties 
increases, firms‟ impacts on the technology standard setting process will increase. In the standards network, 
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd., ZTE Corporation, China Mobile, China Unicom, etc. have more than 100 
direct partners, and these firms have participated in drafting more than 200 standards. The number of 
standards set by ZTE and Huawei is as high as 600, indicating that these firms have strong impacts in the 
standard setting process.  
The quadratic term of degree centrality is significantly and negatively correlated with firms‟ impacts on 
the technology standard setting process (β = -0.0172, P<0.01), and the while degree centrality is positively 
correlated with firms‟ impacts on the technology standard setting process (β = 0.5189, P<0.01), indicating that 
there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between degree centrality and firms‟ impacts on the technology 
standard setting process. In this paper, the degree centrality of China Mobile and China Unicom (128, 107 
respectively) is much higher than that of Shanghai Bell (72), but the number of standards drafted by China 
Mobile and China Unicom is relatively small. In addition, the same phenomenon exists for firms such as 
Emerson Network Power Co., Ltd., and Beijing Power Source Technology Co., Ltd. This means that the 
number of partners cannot be pursued as the only aim in the standards network, and maintaining a moderate 
level of cooperation will help to increase firms‟ impacts on the technology standard setting process. Previous 
studies such as Leiponen (2008) and Zeng et al. (2015) only examined the relationship between the level of 
2)( 
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direct ties (degree centrality) and the influence on firms‟ impacts on the technology standard setting process. 
Based on Uzzi (1997) theory, we examine the relationship between degree centrality and firms‟ impacts on the 
technology standard setting process, and confirm that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
them. Hypothesis 1 is thus verified. 
         
Model 2 examines the relationship between structural holes and its impacts on the technology standard 
setting process. It can be seen from Model 2 that the structural hole has a significantly negative influence on 
firms‟ impacts on the technology standard setting process (β=3.39, P<0.01), indicating that the structural hole 
is conducive for firms to obtain a large number of heterogeneous resources, thereby increasing its own 
resources endowment so as to make a positive impact on standard setting process. In this paper, the structural 
hole indices of ZTE, Huawei, Shanghai Bell and other firms are all above 0.95, indicating that in addition to 
the large number of direct partners these firms are often in the “bridge” position in the network. By leveraging 
diverse ties, they get a lot of heterogeneous resources, which increases their impact on standard setting 
process. Zeng et al. (2015) also confirms that firms with rich structure holes can access heterogeneous 
information, build information-rich networks at lower cost, and obtain non-redundant heterogeneous 
resources from the network faster. Thus Hypothesis 2 is verified. 
Model 3 combines Model 1 and Model 2. In this model, the degree centrality is positively correlated with 
firms‟ impacts on the technology standard setting process (β =0.4540, P<0.01), and the quadratic term of 
degree centrality is significantly and negatively correlated with the degree centrality (β= -0.0147, P<0.01), 
which means that controlling the factor of the structural hole, the degree centrality and firms‟ impacts on the 
technology standard setting process still demonstrate an inverted U-shaped relationship, indicating that the 
firms needs to maintain a moderate level of collaboration size, Hypothesis 1 is further supported. Secondly, the 
structural hole is positively correlated with firms‟ impacts on the technology standard setting process 
(β=0.7667, P<0.05), which means that while maintaining the moderate level of collaboration, occupying 
structural holes is more conducive for firms to obtain non-redundant information and resources and to expand 
its resource endowment, thereby increasing firms‟ impacts on the technology standard setting process. 
Hypothesis 3 is further supported. 
 
4. Conclusion and Implications 
Based on the social network theory, this paper aims to explore how structural embeddedness affects firms‟ 
impact on the technology standard setting process. We construct a network with the national standard data in 
China's communications industry in 2000-2017. With 326 firms participating in the standard formulation as 
the research sample, we use the negative binomial regression method to explore the relationship between 
structural embeddedness of technology sponsors and the impacts on the technology standard setting process. 
We find that while there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the number of direct collaborators and 
firms‟ impacts on the technology standard setting process, the structural holes positively affect firms‟ impacts 
on the technology standard setting process. 
The conclusions obtained from this paper have the following managerial implications: Firstly, in order to 
enhance their impacts on the technology standard setting process, it is necessary for firms to seek 
collaborations such as firms or scientific research organizations that dominant in industry to increase the 
collaboration size. In this study, the dominant firms are ZTE, Huawei, Shanghai Bell and the three major 
telecom operators. Firms should actively expand their cooperation channels and seek opportunities to get 
Table-2. Negative Binomial Model Estimation. 
Independent 
variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
β z P β z P β z P 
DegreCentr 0.5189*** 15.27 0.000    0.4540*** 10.82 0.000 
DegreCentr 
DegreCentr 
-0.0172*** -8.13 0.000    -0.0147*** -6.36 0.000 
StrucHoles    3.39*** 12.13 0.000 0.7667** 2.48 0.013 
Patents 0.0001*** 3.80 0.000 -0.0035 -1.11 0.267 0.001*** 3.06 0.002 
NumbeStan 0.0945*** 3.82 0.000 0.132*** 6.45 0.000 0.0862*** 3.65 0.000 
_cons 0.1753* 1.80 0.071 -0.967*** -4.36 0.000 -0.2369 -1.22 0.221 
Log 
likelihood 
-817.71 -887.69 -814.61 
LR chi2 533.04 393.06 539.24 
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Obs 326 326 326 
Note: ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Journal of Accounting, Business and Finance Research, 2019, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 1-6 
 
6 
access to dominant players. Secondly, while actively access other partners, we may also pay attention to 
obtaining different industry resources and avoid resource redundancy. After accessing partners with high 
status, firms should leverage collaboration opportunities so as to increase the frequency of resource exchange, 
thus further establish a common resource pool to promote the diffuse of tacit knowledge and increase firms‟ 
impacts on the technology standard setting process. Thirdly, the number of partners accessed or resources 
received and exchanged should be moderate, firms are supposed to cooperate within a certain limit. Because 
heterogeneous resources beyond their capabilities may not only be harmful to firms‟ impacts on the technology 
standard setting process, but will cause excessively embeddedness in the network and increase cooperation 
costs. 
As with other research, this article also suffers some limitations. First, this article takes the 
communication industry as the research context, and conclusions may not be generalizable to other industries. 
In addition, this article only considers two measures on structure dimension of embeddedness, the relational 
and cognitive dimensions of embeddedness are needed to be involved in future studies. 
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